PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS by Lynch, Hugh F.
502 
PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
IN LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS 
Hugh F. Lynch 
Since 6 Augll:ot 1945, when the 
United Statcs employed the fir::t atomic 
device in warfarc, Presidcnt Truman'8 
deeision to employ that weapon has 
been both roundly praised and thor-
oughly condemncd. It has been the 
subject of apologia by participants in 
the wartimc decision making process; it 
has becn elucidated by thc members of 
the scientific advisory eommiLLee ap-
pointed by Presidcnt I{ooseve\t; and it 
has been dcfcnded by thc most promi-
nent statesmcn of the century. 1 
Presidcnt Truman in his Memoirs has 
unequivocally claimed responsihility for 
the decision on the w;c of the bomb in 
tllC'sl' words: "Thl' final decision to USI' 
tllC' bOIll!. was ul' 10 1111'. 1.1'1 IllC'n' lit' nn 
lIIislake ahnut it. "2 
Two 1II'I'adl's la(('r an inll-rl'siing hul 
somewhat alarming study conll-ndl'd 
th:lt the decision to l)Omb II iroshima 
and Nagasaki was not rcally I Iurry Tru-
man's. Writing in Political Studies, 
D:lI1iel Snowman argued forcefully that 
a n~ason:lhh: alkrnalivl~ wall 111~nil:(1 IllIl 
COlI\millllt.'r in Chid, th:lt IIHllly lim· 
iting deeisions had preceded tlw dl~ath 
of Frallklin Roosevelt, that with only 
onc execption all of thc President's 
adviscrs favored lise of thc Ilt'W weapon 
against .I apancsc eitil$, and that the 
cirellm:otane($ :1IIc1 gmlls of till: war and 
the investment of $2 billion and 3 Y(lan, 
of work-including that of some o'f the 
most talented scientists in the world-
compelled an affirmative dccision. 3 
In implying that Trumun's politiral 
life demillllh'd a('ll'lies('('n!'c in :t d('('i-
sinn whil-h W:IS in fad Ilnlsidl' of hill 
('nntrol, i\lr. Snnwman I'nslII lali'll :r I'nlll-
hinalinn of ('ir('ulllstillll'I'S whi..J1 only 
Ihl' ('haraeler of a Lil\{loln ('ollid dl'fy. 
Bllt the most disquicting e1clllllnt of 
Snowman's monograph is his assertion' 
thnt the factors which helped to pro-
ducc the compliance of 1945 still 
prevnil.4 
The Unitcd Stntes today continues to 
fight its longest war, enduring some of 
the most restrictive rules of I'ngagemenl 
cver voluntarily endured hy a major 
power. In our second major war since 
Hiroshima, tIll: leaders of lhl~ Armed 
Forccs of the United Stall:s find thal 
their political supcriors have done whaJ 
General I\JacArthur said could not he 
done: instead of ~ekillg complete vil:-
tory, thl'y have pursucd limited goals.s 
Some military leaders IlOW helieve our 
Iluclear weapons have heen needlessly 
hut tightly shaeklcd, with ~rl'at dl'lri-
nll'nt to our national inten'i.'ti.'. Promi-
ncnt among these men is GI'n. Curtis K 
Lemay, former Chief of Staff of the Air 
Forcc.6 
Whilc hoth I\Jr. Snowman's conten-
tion and thc fl:ars of Gcneral Lemay 
may well hc far from the truth of till: 
situation today, they point up the need 
for investigation of the Presidential 
dechlionmaking process regarding the 
usc of nueIcar wcapons. Our Chief 
Execlltivl: should lIeillwr he so n:-
strieled by till! lack of f(!asihlc options 
on the haLLleficld that he is fon:ed to 
abandon the ealltion pn!scrilll'd hy his 
own judgmcnt nor so limited by extra-
neolls factors that he cannot authoril'.e 
the IIS(! of nuclear wcapons when Ill: 
feels they must he employed. 
I t is the purpose of this paper to 
examine the Presidential dccisionmaking 
process in order to identify those forces 
which n'striet the President's freedom 
of action on the nuclear question and, 
furthcr, to determine whether or not 
freedom of choice actually remains with 
tl\(: Comlllllllller in Chil'f. 
In thii.' d,'('adl' thl' 1'1"III,'nt of dwicI' 
for tIll' liN.' or n.lnll:',' of 1IIH'II';lr 
'\'l'allllns ,ltws not 1II'nland dO:'I' I"\allli-
nut ion in thl' ,'ontcxt of ~"n,'r;ll nnclear 
wur so mlleh as in the limited or lo,'al 
war cnvironn~l:nt, for there hus been 
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worldwide n:cognition of the irratio-
nality of unrestrieled thermonlldear 
hombardment undl'r any ein:umstanees. 
I\Jany nuelear strategists and ordinary 
eitil'.l:JJs alike dOllbt the wisdom of any 
bilateral or multilateral use of /luclenr 
weapons. I t is a Gommon fear on both 
sirles of the "} ron Curtain" that any 
cmploYlnent of tactiealnuc1ear weapons 
in Europe will introduce an element of 
instahility whieh could rapidly esealnte 
to the intercontinental nuclear conflict 
equally feared by all. Thus it would 
appenr more important to cxamine the 
l110re tClllpting dl~eision to employ t;I(:-
tical nuclcnr weapons in limited wars 
outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact area. 
This is the deeigion whieh the President 
of the Unitl:d Statl's will IIlOgt lik,'ly 
face in the periodie crises and pro-
tracted local wars likely to occur in the 
last third of thc 20th century. 
Before proceeding further, it would 
be useful to define the term "limited 
war." A number of reccnt books have 
provided excellent definitions of the 
"limited war" concept, one of which is 
Rohert O~ood'g, published in 1957: 
... r a war I in which the hel-
ligercn ts restriet the purposes for 
which they fight to concrete, well-
ddilll,d ohjl!etivl$ that do not 
demand the utmost effort of 
whieh the belligerents are cajJ'1lhle 
and that ean he aeeommodated in 
n IlI'gotiatl:d sl'LLI,:rrwnl. Generally 
speaking, a limited war nctiveiy 
involves only two (or very few) 
major helligerents in the fighting. 
The battle is confined to a local 
geo~raphic an:a and directed 
against sclcded targets-primarily 
those of direct military imp or-
tmH'e. It dl'nHIIII}s of the hellig-
I'n'nts only iI frat,tional ,'omlllit-
llH'nt of their hnlllan a'llll'hysil';11 
n'Stlurt'"s, It lH"rmits Ih"ir 1'("0-
nOlllil', social, and political pat-
ll'rns of cx istelll'e to COil tinu,~ 
without serious disruption.7 
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This dl'finition ad'!({IJat('ly desl:rilH's tlw 
eOlll'I'pL of limited war for the purpost:s 
of Ihis papt'r. 
Tadical nuclear weapons are more 
defiant of aCI:IIrate description. Indccd, 
it has heen said LhaL iL appears impos-
sihle Lo draw a shnrp line IwLween the 
two classes.s This difficulty is notunn:-
laled to the larger proult'm of esealation 
onee nudear wt'apons have het:n inLro-
dueed to the hauld'it:ld. Neither the 
.JoinL Chiefs of Staff nor ~onH: of the 
besL authors on lI\1elear warfan' attempt 
10 pn'('i:O:I'ly defilw tal'lil'al nnl'lt'ar 
weapons. Bernard Brodil: mainLains th;rt 
evt'll Llwir t:lIlploymenl dot·s noL d.:arly 
disLinguish beLween the Lwo eategories. 
He has claimt:d th;rt LIlt: wI:apons 
dropped at Hiroshima and Naga:o:aki 
wt:re as Illueh LacLieal bOlllus as stra-
tegic, '~>,inc(: Lheir yields were of a size 
now regarded as falling entirely wiLhin 
Lhe tadieal r;rnge."9 
Any atLempt aL quantificaLion of the 
par;rllleters of tacLical nuclear weapons 
can only he a very rough approx ima Lion 
ancl may he quickly rendered obsolete 
by virtue of anoLher generation of weap-
onry. Therefore, at LIlt: risk of arbiLrari-
ness and in disagn:emenl wilh Brodi(', 
the following funcLional definition hy 
l; It,nn I I. Snyder will he acct'pl(:d: 
" ... tal'li('al nudt:ar weapons an: shorl-
runge weapons of relatively low explo-
sive power, deployed on or lIear the 
haUldidd art!a, to Ire used for sLriking 
at miliLary targels in the eOlllhat urea or 
directly behind it.,,1 0 
While the above definiLions arc gen-
eral enough Lo apply to mosL cOlllpeti-
tive siLuaLions beLween a major nuclear 
power and the agent or proxy of 
another major nuclear power, direct 
eonfronLaLions of Lwo major nuclear 
powers simply eannot be {'atcgorized in 
this nHI\IJl('r. By a proel$S of for1l1al 
illliilJl(:1' anti rqlt'alt't1 diplo1l1atil' pro-
11011ll"('1I1('nt ... IIH' 1I11ilt'ti Stalt's ha,; 
definer! our intere:-:t in NATO as "vital." 
'\n aLLaek by the Warsaw PacL niltions 
upon our European allies would be 
rt:~an!t:d almo~t :I~ an allal'k u(lon tlw 
United Statl's iL"t'lf. This pfeHenLly 
unique ~ituation thus defi(·s thc defini-
tions and eonsiilt'raLions of this paper. A 
different Et:L of rules applie~. The ability 
of eiLher side to resLrid allY haLLlefronL 
ill Ellropt~ to "limited war" or to avoid 
rapid esealaLion to general nudear war, 
following tlw use of taeLi(':l1 nue!t'ar 
wt:np<l\ls is l'l.'riolJsly qlJl!stioned hy ,:vC'n 
tlw most oLpimistie stratt'gists. In the 
f\lture, con fronta tions wiLh another 
I!ro\\ ing nUl'lear for(,c, that of th,' 
Pl'()plt~'s Ht'puhlie of China. 1I1ay al:;o 
dt'fy the :-:til'ul:ltions of limilt:d wnr. lIul 
for now, the one e:\ct'l'tion conLrary to 
the "rules" of limited wnr :JIlt I which, 
Lherefore, is noL eonsiilen'd within tlw 
purvil'w of Lhis paper, is Ihe NATOI 
Warsaw Pad eompeLiLion in Europe. 
WiLh that :-:ingle exception we will pro-
eeed Lo look aL Lltt: force5 which im-
pinge upon the President in arriving:lL 
his deeision on till: usc of nudl:1lr 
we:lpons. 
Advisers. Consenters and Dissenters. 
A Europ('an, ('ol1lmenling Oil nucle:lr 
stnlLl'gy and dt:lerrenc(: in N,\TO, 01\('(\ 
daillll,d IhaL what rt:ally mallt'n:c\ was 
not so much to have n finger on II\(' 
nuclt:ar trigger, huL raLlwr "to partid-
palt: fully in Ihe formulalion of idt'as, 
I'0liey and ~trategy thaL logt:llwr makl: 
lip the doctrine on which tlw decision 
oft h e American Pn:sidell L must 
depend. "II It is this prot:(:ss of the 
formulaLion of nuclear doeLrine which 
we shaH now examine in order to 
determine if the President is a t:aptive of 
the political sysLem whieh Iw heads or a 
free agent with full power to employ or 
not employ nuclear weapons. 
Any President's decision on the usc 
of nllclear weapons should be (!onr!i-
tioned hy many ye:lrs of eX)lt:rienc(\ in 
(;ovl:rnnJt:nl. Ilopt:fnlly, Ihe individual 
sl ralt'l!il' It'nst's Ill' wl'ars will hI' I'm"t" 
fully grolllltl hy extensiv(! l'llIltacL wilh 
Lhe more relevanL Lheories of deterrence 
and with an intimate knowledge of the 
game of practical intcrnational politics. 
Evcn our more well-prepared Presidents, 
however, have usually been bcttcr 
trained for the domestic arena through 
many years of campaigning and· poli-
ticking. Further, there arc practical 
limits to anyone man's preparation for 
all the decisions referred to a President 
for final resolution. The Commander in 
Chief must rely to some extent, on the 
decisions of his predecessors and the 
options prcsentcd by his advisers. 
One might plausibly assume that 
preeminent am~mg these advisers would 
b(~ the Joint Chiefs of Staff mill the 
large staffs supporting thcm. However, 
this is not true. The most significant 
structural evidcnce of the cxisting lac\-
of apprcciation for the military vicw-
point is the absence of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs from the statutory 
membership 'Df the National Security 
Council. Although his opinions may b(! 
prescntcd p(~rsonally upon invitation to 
NSC meetings or through the member-
ship on the NSC of thc Secretary of 
Defense, his presence is not required by 
law. 
One need only examine the recent 
lit!'rnturc on Pn~sidl"ntial polities a 1111 
foreign affairs to find repeated rcfer-
eIWI!S to Presidentialmistrnst of military 
advice on the usc of nuch!ar weaplllls 
since 1945. Former Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson in recalling the out-
spoken, public advice from thc Defense 
Establishment on employment of the 
atomic bomb during the Korean war 
wrote: 
In August, Secn:tary of the 
Navy Francis P. Matthcws in a 
Rpe(!ch in Boston called for pre-
ventivc war. Hll was made Amba&-
sailor to I rcland. Then Co enernl 
On-iII(' Anderson, Commandant of 
tIll' Air War ColIl'!!l', 1Il1nOUI\l'I'" 
that tIll' Air Fon'l', l'qUipPl'd mill 
ready, only l\Waited orders to 
drop its bombs on Moscow. He 
was retired. 12 
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The doubts of anothcr adminis-
tration in another decade were reflected 
in Bobby Kennedy's book on the Cuban 
missile crisis published after his own 
death. In Thirteen Days, he wrote of 
JFK's impressions on the military advice 
received: 
But he was distressed that the 
representatives with whom he 
met, with the notable exception 
of General Taylor, seemed to give 
so lillIe consideration to the im-
plications of the steps tlwy sug-
geRled .... On tllllt faleful SlIIlIlay 
morning when the Russians 
answered they were withdrawing 
their missiles, it was suggested by 
one high military advisor that we 
attack Monday in any 
case .... President Kennedy was 
disturbed by this inability to look 
beyond the limited military field. 
When we talked about this later 
he said we had to remember they 
were trained to fight and wage 
war-that was their life. Perhaps 
we would feci more coneerned if 
they were always opposed to 
IIsillg anns or mililary Illeans-for 
if IIu:y would not he willing, who 
would be'? But thiR expcriem!e 
Jloinlt:d Oil t for liS all tlll~ illlpor-
tance of civilian direction and 
control and the importance of 
raising probing questions to mili-
tary recommendations. 1 3 
Whilc this last statement demon-
stratcs the basic skcpticism among poli-
tical Icadcrs for military solutions, at 
thc same time it also reveals a respect 
for the duty of the Joint Chiefs to "tell 
it like it is," to report the military 
siltllliion as mililary men, and after that 
for Ihl' politil~al h:aders 10 make the 
politil'al dl'l'isiom~ mill sland n'sponsihle 
for thl'lll. 
On the nuclear issue lIlany con-
flicting positions have been taken by 
high-ranking men in uniform. For every 
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one who would recommend the use of 
nuclear wcapons in limited war, thcre 
has been anothcr like Vice Adm. Charles 
E. "Cat" Brown, former Commander, 
6th Fleet, who publicly stated: "1 have 
no faith in so-call cd controlled usc of 
atomic weapons .... I would not rccom-
mend the use of atomic wcapons, no 
matter how small, whcn both sides have 
thc powcr to destroy thc world. " 
Admiral Brown addcd that he did not 
bclicve there was any dependable dis-
till(:tion between taetieal, or loeali:r.ed 
and restricted targets or situations, mill 
strategic or unlimited situations.! 4 
It often happens that Presidents will, 
in times of crisis, turn for advice not to 
the military, but to a group of Ameri-
cans not always respectfully referred to 
as "the intellectuals." Since World War 
II the number of people outside the 
Military E!;tablishment professionally 
engaged in the study of defe:nse policy 
has grown from a handful to hun-
dreds. 15 The President of the United 
States can now choose among defense 
intellcctuals from rcsearch corporations 
and l'UIIIIllISPS for allernutive sources of 
udviee. The growth of "think tunks," 
such as the Rmul Corporation, the 
Institute for Strategic Studies, and the 
Hudson Institute, has been more than 
matched by the: growth of sc:lf-styled 
institutes thut have appeared on tlw 
campuses of the finest universities in the 
country. These academicians have had a 
strong impact on the formulation of 
policy in Washington through their 
writings and consultative services. 
The "McNamara phenomenon" 
introduced a group of these intellectuals 
called "the whi:r. kids," and it would he 
politically naive not to reeogni:r.e! that 
this element is here to stay. The military 
servic:es should carefully note-as one 
professional \V hitt: I\ouse: ohserve:r has 
notcd-tllilt tlH! young Ph.D.'s who t:om-
pose this group have! heen found quill: 
useful. They stilI hold key positions in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
and the burgeoning staff of the National 
Security Council. I 6 
It is very important to remember the 
influence of such advisers on the formu-
lation of stratcgy and in crisis manage-
ment. Their background briefings and 
policy papers provide the intellectual 
blinders through which any Prcsidcnt 
will view a crisis. 
A I though thcse "defense intel-
lectuals" can be found in any numhcr of 
age·neies frolll OSI) (Ofliee' of til(: Seen:-
tary of Defense:) to nEt> (Offi('(! of 
Emergency Preparedness), thos(: who 
are closest to the President will have 
greatest influence. The "President's 
Men" serve a most valuable function. 
Their ability to advise the President 
without reference to bureaucratic pro-
cedures or compctitions will always 
cneourage Presidcntial trust in a small 
group of able men. From ont: adminis-
tration to anothcr, their collective name 
may change-for example JFK's 
"EXCOM" and LBJ's "Tuesday 
Luneh "-but their function will remain 
till' ~ame. The' e'ompo~ition of thi~ /!fOUP 
lIIay be virtually the' ~:une a~ tht' 
National See'urity Cmllwil or lIIay in-
clude fcw of thosc positions, depcnding 
on the style of the Presidcnt. He can use 
the: NSC as little or :Hi ,"lI<:h as he 
wishes. lIe is solely n:s(lon!iihle for 
determining what policy mattcrs will be 
handled within its framework.! 7 It is 
for this reason that thc President can 
and should be held accountable for his 
decisions. Though the system he uses 
may limit the options or advice that arc 
prcsented to him, it is the President 
himself who dctcrmines his working 
environmcnl. 18 This dominance of the 
pe:rsonality of onl: man disturbcd poli-
tical scientists in thc y(:ars bdore 
nudear power lind now gelH'raLc:s (:vcn 
more (!oneern. In 1941 Erlwin Corwin 
or Princeton ex 1'1"(!g.~ed fear that the 
Presidcncy had he:collle dangerously pcr-
sonali:r.ed in two ways: 
.•. fir!'t, thallhe I,~aden;hip whieh 
il affords is dependenl alto~elher 
on the aecidenl of personality 
a(!:aillsl which our hapha1.ard 
nll!thpd of !'clc(:till(!: presidents of-
fers no /!:uarantee; and, sl'colldly, 
tlUll there is 110 governmental 
body whidl eUI1 III' rdied upon to 
~i\',: the Pmsidmlt illllependent ad-
vicI! mul whieh Iw is Iu:verthl''''!'s 
boulld to eOl1sull. 19 
i\lnrl' n:c('ntly, UI'ury Sh'l'le COIII-
IlJa~I:r ,:xpn::;''i"d his vil:ws on Pro'sidl'n-
tial power from a diffl:n:nt aspecl: 
... the po!'ses.~ion of power ('n- , 
I!OUr:I/.!:I'S mill l:vI'n I:n:all:s eOIl-
ditions whil'h :'1'('ln to n'qllin: ils 
usc, alld ... the grl'ater aud more 
!:onchl!'!V(: .tIH: power tIll! stron/!:cr 
tlw argument\ for its IISC. Tho~l: 
who 1;I~sscss authority wanl to 
I'xerei~e il: childrell, teacher~, 
bos.~es, hureaucrat!', (:ven !'olrlier:; 
amI statesnll:n .... Men who pos-
sess powl:r think it a shame to I('l 
po\\'I'r go to wa:,II' mill "onll,tiIllI'S. 
IlI'rhal's lllll'on:wiously, tlw), lIIan-
Ilfal'lllrl' silnalions in "hi('h il 
lIlust he u!'ed .... All Ihis wa!' 
daug('wus hul not intoler,lhle in 
1111: pm-atomic ,lgI~; il is uo IOllgl'r 
tolerabk 2 0 
,\11 1111: fon:goill(!: mighl suggl:st Ihal 
tIll' Pro'!'idl'nt IJa~ ('omplete frl!l'dolll, 
afll:r all Ihe adviee is in, to US(: or nol 10 
u!'e Ihe nudear wI:apons under his !:Oln-
lIIarlll. Sui'll a eOll!'lu"ioll would he 
I'rrolwous. For as oue l:xperil'IIl:(:d 
White House advisl'r has cOlllnwlIlI'd, 
"Iill is dl~ar •.. Ihat a Presidl'nl's 
aUlhority is lIol as grl'al as his respon-
gibility alld tlUll what is desirahll: is 
always lilllill'd by what is possiblt, or 
pcrmissihll'. ,,21 
II would III' fooli"h for a Pn'"idl'nl 10 
il!lIon' IIII' opposilion and limitation" III: 
r,\(:('s oulside 1111: I'Xl'('utivc hralldl. Thl' 
gn'ah'st ('hl'ck!lII tllI~ Pro'sident's po\\'('r 
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is lIlt: Congn:s!', Yet it has beeu in the 
fidd of foreign affairs amI str.ategy-
making when: Congress, at h~a!'t until 
the late I 9 (,()'s. !'howed its gn:ate!'l 
weaklll'!'s. The fl:w Conl!res~lIlen who 
have I,,:.:n c~x I)(~rts in defense policy havc 
ad.:d ehil!lly as lohhyists with the exee-
ulive hrandl. Instead of seeking strength 
in Congrf:ss for their poinl of vicw, most 
hav(~ used tlH:ir rcsourc(',; Lo get a 
hearing with tlw Prcsident.22 
One !'tudy, hy James Hobinson. in 
whieh he tabulal!:s foreign jloli,'y and 
dl'fl'n!'l: issu($ from Ihe lale 19:1O'" to 
IWI I, shows dominanl infhwllce hy 
Congress in only one case oul of s(:ven, 
tIll! 1954 rleeision nol to intervene with 
ilrJIl!'!I forc'l: (sonH: ,;ay ineluding IIII1:h'ilr 
) . I I I' 23 '1'1 wl'apons 111 III 01' IIna. 1<11 0111' 
decision symholi1.':s for Con!!:f('ss today 
a sLate or affairs which it hopes to 
achievc in the lwar future. 
,\ecording to Chalmcrs Roherts of 
the JVa,~hillgton Post, certain congrcs-
!'ional Icaders were invitcd in j 954 to 
the StaLe Department to consider a joint 
resolution to be pn:!'ented to Congress 
which would III'r1nil Ihe U!'I: of nil' and 
naval (l0wl'r in I IlIlnehilln, Two Sl'nnlnrs 
m'(' rl'porl!'d 10 hnve asked 1llIl'!'lions of 
Ihe briefers. Firsl. SenaLor ClenwnL'i 
nsked whether the Chairman of Ihe 
Joinl Chids had 11u: .supporl of hi!' 
l:olI,:agues mI(l was told thatlHIIII: of tlu: 
other I:hids approved. Tlu:n Sellator 
Lyndon B. Johnsoll asked wlU:llu:r any 
U.S. allies had Iwen eOllsulll~d nnd was 
told tlll'y hnd not been. Bolh answers 
wen: unsatisfa<:Lory, nnd tl\l: resolu Lion 
was IU:VI:r referred to Ihc full Congn:ss 
for (!onsideration?4 I t is significant 
I'ven in this one eas(~ of effeelivl! con-
gn~ssional persuasion that, of thl' mili-
tary, Admiral Radford stood alone in 
dl'fl:nSl~ of tlw proposed (!oursl: of 
adion. and our allies had nol yl~t 
eo II I'urrl'c\. 
Pnn'n 11H'lil'ally, (; I'n('ral I~ idgway 's 
l'Ol\lnwnts on this episode. wriLlen in 
19!i(). inl'lude, among otlwr things, this 
relevant slatel\lent: 
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. . . that same old delusive idea 
was advanced-that we could do 
things the cheap and easy way, by 
going into Indo·China with air and 
naval forces alone. To me this had 
an ominous ring. For I fell sure 
that if we committed air and naval 
power to that area, we would have 
to follow them immediately with 
ground forces in support. 
I also knew thal none of those 
advocating such a step had any 
accurate idea what such an opera-
tion would cost in blood and 
money and national effort. 2 5 
It is also interesting to look b<lck <It 
the Cuban missile crisis to find Senators 
Richard B. Russell and .I. William Ful-
bright arguing for!'dully, after being 
briefed on·: the <letion contempl<lted by 
the administration, that bloekade was 
not a strong enough course.26 
Other instances of congrcssion<ll 
weakness could be recited, ad nauseum. 
The situ<ltion has not changl'd in Vil'l-
nam. Congress and ('on/!l"essional eOI\1· 
mittees have bc(!n singulnrly ineffel!live 
in either forcing the administration to 
apply "the force that is required" to the 
bombing of the North "to sec the job 
through," or to require the rapid with· 
drawal of our troops by any spe<:ifie 
deadline? 7 When the executive branch 
makes up its collective and individual 
mind to do something in international 
affairs, it still appears that Congress is 
unable to successfully oppose it. 
Uomcstie public opinion docs have 
some effect on the decision to usc 
nuclear weapons. Although the exec-
utive branch, espel:ially during the 
Eisenhower years, has on o!'cagion 
threatened their use rather subtly with-
out suffering at the polls, the irreparahle 
damage incurred when a candid,lte it' 
effedively lalH'lecl "nuke-happy" i" :1 
h,t't'on whi!'h will nol III' fortrolll'n b\' .. , 
prt!t'id('ntial e,lIIt1idateg for ),l'arg to 
conle. This polilieal fact of life was 
recognized -eilrly in the J 9M, campaign . 
Said Time magazine: "While Goldwatl:r 
vt:llCmently protests thaL he is not nuke-
happy, il is this rt:pu tation tll(lL is 
ruining his chances for e11!ction. Unless 
and until he can rid himself o[ the 
image, he hasn't a hope of entering the 
White House. ,,28 Whether such a cam-
paign prohibition appreciably affects 
Presidential decisions once in office is 
probably known only hy the office-
holders themselves. Certainly there have 
been outstanding demonstrations of 
political independl'nee by Presidents not 
faced with reelection. Harry Truman 
faced a strong reaction in his handling 
of General l\IaeArthur and his accep-
tance of limited goals in Korea; Lyndon 
Johnson is said 10 have :Wqllil;g(!I'd in a 
"proce~s of national illlpl!adnllenL" in 
11,~('idin~ not to run for n~('I(,t:tion,29 
While pressures from Allleriean puhlic 
opinion would not restrain an American 
President in a sudden and serious emer-
geney, certainly they would have some 
restrictive effect on the decision for a 
first usc of nuclear weapons against a 
nonnlldear erwlIIY. slu'h as we hav(' 
opposed in Korea anti Vidnam, 
Tlw words of J erferson's caution to 
pay "a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind," still is valid today. Our allies 
will certainly in fhwnee any Ile<:ision 10 
lise or not USt: nuclear weapons. \V IIrltl 
public opinion also will have some 
measure of influence 011 the Prcsident. 
In late 1950 there occurred u dl!lIlon-
stratiol1 of close inLeraetion among the 
members of the NATO alli:mce upon 
the U.S. prosl!eution of the Korean war. 
When Harry Truman hinted on :30 
Novemher that, if necessary, the atomic 
bomb would he l115ed in Korea, notl:vlm 
a tadflll "I'larification" in a pn's,,, rl~­
II'usI: laLer tIll! ganll: day I!ould lIIurfh! 
the reaction in Europe, Two days lall'r 
the Prinll' I\liniglers of FraneI' mill Cr('at 
Brit:lin !t,ft for \V:I"hingloll 10 I'onllnllni-
1':111' IllI'ir ('Onl'I'r"n.;J" 
I'n't'idl'nt Ei"I'nhnwl'r :IIt'o n'spOIllh,(1 
10 British pn'sglln:s on tIll! mall('r of 
Qucmoy alld {\Iatsu in L957. Whcn 
artillcry picces capable of firing nuclear 
weapons wcre transportcd to Quemoy, 
thc mcssagc was not lost on the main-
land Chincsc. Thcir shclling of thc island 
droppcd off precipitously.3 1 But thc 
mcssagc was also reccivcd in Great 
Britain, and Harold Macmillan was 
quick to point out, quoting Winston 
Churchill's statement during L1w 
1954~1955 crisis: "A war to kecp the 
coastal islands for Chiang would not bc 
dcfensible" in Brit:lin.3'2 Eisenhower 
also noted in his mcmoirs: "The usc of 
evcn small atomic bombs could scarcely 
fail to rcsult, for a while, in a worldwide 
fceling of revulsion against the United 
States, a feeling which might be lesscncd 
if these relatively small weapons were 
uscd solely against military installations 
minimizing fallout and civilian casu-
al ties. ,,3 3 
From thc foregoing it is rcasonable 
to conclude that, on thc nuclear issuc, 
the President is rcsponsive to many 
pressurcs from Illany quarters: Congr(!ss, 
pllblic opinion, ollr allies, and diffl'fl'nt 
VOil'I':; withill thl' admini::tratilln. III' l'ari 
undouhtl'dly 1.1\' inllul'lIl'l'd ill his de('i-
sion, bllt tlHlt is not the same as 
controlling it. HI! may havc less than 
perfcct frcedom because of these pres-
sures, but they by no mealls pre(!lIIpt his 
authority. lit! will always havl! two 
options: to usc or not to IISC nudear 
weapons. In a crisis situation, whcn the 
need for sllch weapons is grcatest, he 
will havc the ability to choose either 
option. 
The Influence of Strategy. "Thc 
atLraetiveness of limited war as an alter-
nativc to total war," Brodic has writLcn, 
"starts from the fact that as a mallcr of 
national policy we have conclusively 
forsworn prevcntive war. ,,34 This polic:y 
may be questioncd by somc of our more 
extrcme "hawks," hut we should ('on-
sitkr briefly the l'Ollllllcnt of Gellt'ral 
Ridgway on tlw cffieaey of the bOlllh as 
a tool of war on the Asian Continent: 
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On this enorlllous land mass 
true victory in war could only be 
ohtaincd by ddeating thl! cnemy's 
armed forces, d('stroying his hope 
for victory and his will to resist, 
and establishing control ovcr his 
land and people. Mass destruction 
of his' industrial resources is only 
one way to ncutralize his capacity 
to wage war. Sueh destruction 
may not destroy his will to resist; 
it may strengthen his determi-
nation. It may have but little 
effect initially on his forces in the 
field. It estahlishes no ultimate 
control over his land. 
Furthermore, to my mind, 
such mass destruction is repug-
nant to thc ideals of a Christian 
nation. It is incompatiblc with the 
basic aim of the free world in war 
which is to win a just and lasting 
peace. Lasting peace can only be 
won by changing the defeatcd 
i1gl!ressor into a constructive mem-
lwr of the s(WieLy of fn'e 
lIal ion::.:\ 5 
It i:: to be hoped that tlw::l! fl~dings 
arc shared not only Ly our own natiollal 
leaders, but also hy the national leaders 
of our opponcnls. If thl! ('IWIlIY first 
re~orts to the use of 1IIIt:l(~m· w(:aponH, 
our option to refrain from silllilnr lI:;e is 
almost certainly foreclosed. It is incon-
eeivablc to this writer that any President 
could resist the imperative to retaliate. 
Several circumstances might en-
courage a President to consider the use 
of nuclear weapons when his own beller 
judgment dictated otherwisc. Any man 
faeed with f(':;ponsibility for a large-
seall! local defeat, a loss of "face," 
prestige, natiomll honor, and the liv~s of 
"American boys" may well conclude 
tlwt the attendant risks of esc:llation arc 
now les.'i illlportant. This situalion is not 
without historieal pr(!(:edenl. I II late 
1950 Auwriean troops in Kon:<1 were 
threatencd with expulsion from the 
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peninsula unless reinforcements soon 
arrived to bolster their defenses or a 
political settlement could be achieved 
with the North Koreans. Here the de-
mands of military necessity could have 
forcefully argued for the usc of nuclear 
weapons. A Pusan evacuation might 
have ended a disastrous campaign. Yet 
the extremity of that situation stiII did 
not guarantee that nuclear authorization 
would be forthcoming. 
\V e may not necessarily be correct in 
assuming the enemy will again rceklessly 
push us to the wall in the future. I II this 
regard we must heed the example or 
President Kennedy who, in the events of 
October 1962, cautioned: "\Ve don't 
want to push [Khrushchev] to a preeipi-
tous action-give him time to (:on~ider. I 
don't want to put him in a corner from 
which he cannot escape. ,,3 6 Likewise, 
the "initocr!lts of Soviet Russia and Cuba 
may have learned an important lesson 
from the same experience. As Schelling 
has pointed out, they may have come to 
realize, in the wake of their under-
estimation of the U.S. reaction to the 
crisis, that "however peaceable the Pres-
ident may want to he, there were 
political limits to his patience. ,,37 
Another common reason favorinj!; the 
Uf;e of tactical nuclear wcapons is tlwir 
"cost effectiveness." By now tlH~ priee 
of nudear weapons is less than the cost 
of high cxplosivc weapons of equivalent 
yiekl and effectiveness.3 8 l\lore re\(:v,mt 
is the fact that tens of thousands of 
tactical nuclear devices are already 
"paid for" and stockpiled. American 
gencrals have c1aimcd that this reason 
alonc dictates the use of such ceonolll-
ical means.3 9 Any such urging ignores 
the considerations of the increased costs 
in human and material rcsoun:es re-
sulting from the higher levels of destruc-
tion obtninable throuj!;h nuclear warfare. 
The :tvaihtbility of the dleap 1I11d(~ar 
weapons to mall)' slaks af{!;UCS a{!;aillst a 
cOl't-dfeel i\'e nue\ear strategy. 
Thefe is no question of the nec,~ssity 
for tactical nue\ear weapons in our 
arsenal. They wiII always serve, just as 
our strategic ICBM's do, as deterrents to 
blackmail by any nuclear-armed enemy. 
They have been and are being used to 
physicalIy define our most vital interests 
in Europe. They will always provide the 
nuclear umbrella under which we elln 
meet limited :Iggressions with conven-
tional force. 
There lire many valid reasons for 
refraining from the first usc of nuclellr 
weapons. Perhaps the most obvious 
hrake is acknowledgment that "the 
moment we st:trt visualizing them being 
used reciproeaIly, their usc ecasl~s to 
look overwhelmingly advantageous to 
us. ,,40 Nuclear capabilities may prolif-
erate, and it iR not inconeeiv:thle that 
nudear arllls will someday bl~ Iluuh: 
available to many smaller states. In 
these circumstances it would be unwise 
to "break the icc" by employing nuclear 
weapons for a nonvital purpose. 
In The Year 2000, Herman Kahn 
contends that as many as 50 countries 
may have access to nuclear weapons.41 
Long hefore that· time the Chinese 
People's Republic will d('vclop and 
hmndish taclie:tlnuclear weapons. Their 
hehavior with respect to their small 
lIeighhors 011 the "rim of Asia" will he 
in part conditioned by the previous 
p(~rrormance of otlu:r nud(~ar POW(!r/;. 
An ohl'Crvation of "Im:al wars" in Iii· 
c:ttes tll:lt fan:ttical local leaders often 
life d(:termined tl) achieve their own 
political goals with liLLie regard for the 
controls and :Igreements of the Great 
Powers. The very obvious conclusion is 
thal "indigenous self-restraint cannot 
:tlw:tys be counted on to k(:e!, local 
confliets either local or limiled.'i42 The 
dangers that will accrue when and if 
these leaders possess crude nuclear 
weapons arc obvious. 
Also restraining the President is thr. 
tradilion of nonn:;e whidl has grown 
and is ~rowing. l~lIdl y(~ar Ilw "fin', 
break" bctwcl'J\ l~onventiOlt:\1 :11111 
nuclear we:tpons becomes morro difficult 
to cross. One proponcnt of thc 
"firebreak" theory, Thomas Schelling, 
mainLains that upon the first use of 
nudmlrs the participants will have 
moved out of the realm of the "Lac-
tical" into the highest levels of strategic 
bargaining.4 3 He cautions: 
This is not an event to be squan-
dered on an unworthy miliLary 
objeeLive. The first nuclear deto-
nation can convey a message of 
utmost seriousness; it may be a 
unique lIleans of ("ollllllllllieation 
in a mOlllenL of IIIl1lsual gravity. 
To dcgradl: the signal in advance, 
Lo depreciate the currency, to 
erode gradually a tradition that 
might somedHY be shaLlered with 
diplomatic effect, Lo vulgarize 
weapons that have acquired a 
transcendent status, and to de-
mote nuclear weapons to the 
staLus of merely efficient artillery, 
may be to waste an enormous 
assct of last resort.44 
The restrictive faeLors listed above 
would seelll to weigh more heavily on 
tIm President than the factors whieh 
encourage tactical nuclear warfare. The 
l!apital investment and cost-effectiveness 
argumen ts have beell set aside in hoth 
major limited wars in whidl we hHve 
belm engaged, as w!!ll as in lIumerous 
lesser engagements. During this time, 
the uuclear capabilities of both the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China have grown. Now the hazards 
of engaging the proxies of these two 
Communist powers in a bipolar nuclear 
confrontation arc increased. If the 
reasons for avoiding the usc of nuclear 
weapons were compelling in the past, 
they are, therefore, even more compd-
ling now. 
Past Presidential Decisions. Stratqric 
planners have voil'ed I:OI1('ern over Ihe 
question of whether politil'al leaders 
would have the nl:ees,';ary wiII ,md deter-
mination to usc nudear weapons in 
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situations where they were required. 
One man who confounds such blanket 
indietments is Harry Truman. With no 
well-defined nuclear strategy to consult 
and little time for reflection on the 
subject, he made the decision to drop 
atomic weapons on two Japanese cities. 
Yet, when American troops were com-
mitted to combat in Korea, the same 
man used the utmost restraint even 
when his forces were being badly 
beaten. 
In critieizing the theory of "massive 
rd,llialion," CelH:ral Taylor revi,:ws this 
d;'cision, noting thai, even though the 
United States had a virtual monopoly of 
nuelear weapons, "for reasons sufficient 
un to our responsiblt: leaders at the 
time," the United States chose Lo fight a 
limited war for limited objectives. He 
also commented that "this was, and still 
is, a hard fact for many military pole-
mists to swallow. ,>45 
Among them was Lt. Gen. James M. 
Gavin, who wrote in retirement: 
... when the Korean situation 
hroke and the prospects of thl: 
defeat of the Sth Army were real 
and compelling, General Nichols 
and I ... urged ... that we usc 
uuclear weapons against the North 
Korean I·'on:,:s. II woul,1 IllIve 
heen militarily ilH:xeusahll! 10 
ullow the 8th Army to he de-
stroyed without even using the 
most powerful weapons in our 
arsenal. Yet we almost did so! ... 
The situation in the summer of 
1950 offered us a number of well 
worthwhile tactical nuclcar targets 
if we had the moral courage to 
make the decision to usc them.4 6 
Harry Truman had ccrtainly demon-
strated the rcquisite "moral courage" in 
the P'lst. And in a careful mwlysis of thc 
Korean ea:;l" Ikrnanl Brndi,' ,Ioeu-
melliI'd four good re,l:mns why Truman 
dedincd their use this time. Tlwy wert:: 
(I) the JoinL Chiefs of Staff and civilian 
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policymakcrs helieved that Lhc Korean 
war wa~ a feillt hy thc Sovicts for the 
prin<:ipal threaL whieh woul,) eome later 
in Europe; (2) loeal Ail' Force eOIl1-
mallders reported thaL then: were 110 
slIiLable targeLs for aLomic weapons ill 
Korea; (3) our allie8 werc sLrongly 
opposed to Lhe USI: of aLomie weapons 
in Korl'<I; and (,t.) we al~o feared Lhe 
retaliation of Lhe Soviets, wiLh their 
~mall sLoek of :ILolllie we,!}JOns, againsL 
Pusan or tar~elS in .I apan,4 
When we consider thc puhlie senti-
IIIcn L in favor of thc "old soldil~r," 
filaeArthur, it mip;ht he said LhaL the 
Man from Independencc earned that 
title and demom:trated greater moral 
courage by desisting from Lhe lH;t~ of the 
atomic bomb in Korea, The full measure 
of his fortiLude can only be appreciaLed 
when one con~idcrs Lhe re~LrainL Lhe 
administration was conLell1l'latinp;, Gen-
cral Collins wriLes of the concern of Lhe 
British in the conference of Deeernber 
1950, previously referred to, and tlw 
n~sul tin~ ap;reement: 
In the filial eondusions of thl' 
eouferces it \\lIS up:reed that a 
cease-fire Ullt! pcacd'ul solutioll of 
the eOllfliel were de5iruble ill tlw 
immediaLe flltllre, if Lhey could he 
st~eurcd Oil honorahle tt:rlll5, Ilow-
ever, such a solution would noL he 
burtered wiLh the Chine8e COIII-
lIlunists ill excll:lllp;e for our with-
drawing proLeetion from Formosa 
or Illdo-Chinu, If no solu Lion 
could be obtuined, the Amerieun 
ulld British troops would fight on 
in Koreu unlcs,~ they were forced 
out. The Secretary of Stutl' so 
in f ormcd Cent'ral I\IaeArthur. 
(~:mphasis udded)48 
In tht' rUlllou~ pre~s stut,'nu'nt whi('h 
prolliptt'" lilt' ulli"tI ':Olll't'I'I'IU"', Trllillan 
h;ul hillll'd Ilwl, now Ihal lIlt' COIIIIIIU-
ni,:t Chin"H' WI'I'I' in tIlt' l\.ort'an \Iar, he 
mip;ht use IIl1dear weapons. In Ihe up-
roar tlwt !'ollowetl, the White Iiouse 
released a second sLuLemenL designed Lo 
correct Lhe siLuution: " •.• by law, only 
the President ean authoril'.(: 'the USt: of 
the uLom bomb und no such au Lho-
ril'.aLion hus been given.,>4 9 
President 'l'rumun had revealed his 
attitude toward nuclear weapons in 
previous sLaLcmcn Ls. "Y ou have to 
lIIulersLand thaL this isn't u military 
weapon" Iw said firmly, "so we have got 
10 twaL this differenLly from rifles and 
"50 cannon, ... 
PresidenL Eislmhower, on the other 
hand, has been held up as an adhcrenL 
to the philosophy thaL nur.l(!ar weapons 
ough L to be used like artillery, on tIll: 
basis of effieieney.51 Some would 
dOllht, how,wt'r, thaL Lhese wcre his trill: 
fl'c1ings und eitt: his willingncss to nego-
tiate thc suspension of nuclear testing as 
clear evidenc(: that he was influenced by 
the psychol!>gieal and symbolic status of 
nucleur weapons.5 2 
BuL iL was in Lhis basic difference of 
aL\itudt~s, real or posed, LhaL the nuclear 
iS~lIe first ht~t:anw a politit'al footlHlII in 
Ihe 1952 d"t:tion. Prior to tIll! Rel'lIh-
liean Convenlion, Ikl' had St't'n no ('as), 
way to end Ihe war. On 5 .I111l(! he 
dt'dan~d: "I do not bdi,'vt' that in till! . 
presenL sillHltion there is any' c1ean·cuL 
unswer Lo hringing the Korean \V ar to a 
~1I(:e,~~sl'lIl eondu~ion,,,5 J Two w,'eks 
lalt'r, when nu:t!ling wilh the delt'gations 
from Oregon and Arizona, he refused to 
advocate esealaLion of the war. He 
warned the delegates that seeking a 
miliLary vit:Lory on LIII: peninsula would 
mcan risking a gencral war.54 In thus 
staLing his posiLion, General Eisenhower 
hroke publicly wiLh tlw MaeArthur-Taft 
strategy and thaL wing of the Repub-
lican Party which had heen bcrating the 
J)'!lIlocraLie administration's limited war 
philosophy.55 
Y 1'1 wht'n III' h"(',IIIW Pn'sid"III, I k,,'s 
Ihrl'al 10 witl,'n Ih,' war mltl u:-;,' II 10111 it, 
1\I';I\,on:-; \1':1:-; t'rt'elilt',1 wilh hdllp: IIII' 
1II0si illlportant t'I('III,'nt in illlproving 
arillisliee nt'p:otiations.5 6 I t was this 
willingness to threaten LIIl! liSt: of 
nuclear weapons which also turned the 
tide at Quemoy in 1958. After three 
nuclear-capable 8-ineh howitzers were 
brought ashore on the coastal island, the 
Chinese rescinded their test of the will 
of the UniLed States.5'7 Likewise in 
Korea in 1958, after similar capabilities 
were inLroduced there by the U.S. 
Army, Chinese Lroops wiLhdrew from 
NorLh Korca.5 8 
To point Lo such suecesscs' is noL to 
impute recklessness to the Eisenhower-
Dulles game of brinkmanship. While Ike 
LhreaLencd the usc of nuclear weapons, 
hc was fully aware of the asymmeLry of 
his adversary's arsenal. And his oLher 
moves demonsLrated a healLhy respect 
for thc (:ssenLial diff(!rl!llce beLween 
conVl'nLionul and nudeur wenpon~. 1 L is 
significant that during thc Lebunon 
landing in 1958 the U.S. Army had an 
Honest John' rocket afloat off Beirut 
but was not allowed Lo land it bceause it 
could fire an atomic warhead as well as 
a convenLional onc.5 9 
In the struggle over Quemoy, Ike und 
Dulles had prepared u memo for the 
record which considered the opLions 
short of tactical nuclear weapons. In 
parL, it read: 
If the Communists, aeLing on the 
supposiLion Lhat wc will not 
aeLivdy inLervene, sel~k to take 
Quemoy by assauIL ... then: 
might be a period between Lhe 
beginning of assault and irrevo-
cable commitment whcn prompt 
and subsLanLial U.S. inLervention 
with conventional weapons might 
lead the Chieoms Lo withhold or 
rcverse thcir aS5uult effort. OLher-
wise our inLervention would 
probably not be effecLive if it 
were limited to the usc of conven-
tionnl weapons.6 0 
Further, in eonsirlerinl! tlw dlnlh'np:,~ 
to Formo:'u hy Chuirmnn l\lnll in IIII' 
latl' sUJllmer of 19!iB, I ke noted the 
change of circumstances since Lhe 
previous threaLs of 1955. 
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For one thing, the Soviets had 
used the intervening years to build 
up their nuclear strike force, 
which now included a more formi-
dable arsenal of hydrogen 
weapons. I did not doubt our 
total superiority, but any large-
scale conflict stimulated here was 
now less likely Lo remain limiLed 
to a conventional use of power.61 
] f the Eisenhower administration had 
learned that nuclear weapons could he 
purchased wiLh rubles as well as dollars, 
suhsequcnt Presidents would have to 
acknowledge in their strategies that they 
also can be purchased for francs, yen, 
and undoubtedly many other eurren-
ci($. 
The distinctive philosophy of the 
Eisenhower years was first introduced 
by Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles when he used the term "massive 
retaliation" in a speech before the 
Council of Foreign Relations in January 
]951),.62 
Dulles emphasized that the policy 
was a new one, resulting from some 
hasic policy decisions made hy the 
National Security Council. "The basic 
'd .. "I '1" J J eelSlon, Ie sal(, was to I epl:IH 
primarily upon a great capacity to reLal-
iall:, insL:lJltly, and hy nwans and nl 
"I:\(:es of our own 'ello()~ing." 'I'It(: 
benefit was to be "more hasic security 
at less cost. ,>6 3' . 
This philosophy was to come under 
lire from an Army man, Gen. Maxwell 
Taylor, in his writings published be-
tween his term as Army Chief of Staff 
for Eisenhower and later service as 
Chairman of the J oint Chiefs for Ken-
nedy. But the first official and public 
break in the application of this philos-
oph)' came from within the ranks of the 
aelive-service military serving the Eisen-
hower arllllinistrnlion. On 12 NoV!'mlll:r 
19!i7. in CiIH'innnli, Ohio, (:I'nl'rnl 
Lnuris Nor:;tud, thl'n Supreme Com-
mander of NATO forces in Europe, 
delivered a speech in which he stated: 
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"If ... we have means to meet less-than-
ultimate threats with a decisive, but 
less-than-ultimate response, the very 
possession of this ability would dis-
courage the threat, and would thereby 
provide us with essential ~olitieal and 
military maneuverability. "6 
This was not then called the "strate-
gy of flexible response," but it did 
include the basic philosophy of a paper 
entitled "A National Military Program" 
which General Taylor had prepared for 
the JCS in 1956.65 This strategy was to 
become the hallmark of the Kennedy! 
McNamara years. 
Before he took office, President Ken-
nedy had read and was impressed by 
Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet. 
He had campaigned on the so-called 
"missile gap," and once in office he 
initiated a review of U.S. and Soviet 
ICBM capabilities. Before the results of 
this survey were known, JFK, in four 
separate passages of his first defense 
message to Congress on 28 March ] 961 , 
renounced any intention to exerei~e a 
first-strike option.6 6 I t was a !'peeeh 
intended as Illueh for Bus:;iall ear!' a:-; 
any others. And it, like future poliey 
statements and actions, was ealeulah'd 
to remove much of the instability of the 
nuclear arms race. 
On tactical nuclear welll'0ns the mt:~ 
sage was clear. Maxwell Taylor's out-
look had been clearly stated in his 
proposed "New National Military Pro-
gram." "The question of using atomic 
weapons in limited wars would be met 
by accepting the fact that primary 
dependence must be placed on conven-
tional weapons while retaining readiness 
to use tactical atomic weapons in the 
comparatively rllre cases where their u!',' 
would be to our national intercst.'>6 7 
The same attitudes were pervm~ive in 
the D(,fense E:-;Iablishment. Depllly 
S""rdar), Boswell (; ilpalri(: ~li(1 Oil () 
.11111(' IlJh I Ihlll Ill', for one, ha,1 "III'\'l'r 
believed in a so·called limited llul'lear 
war. I just don't know," he con tinued, 
"how you build a limit into it on!:e you 
start using any kind of nuclear bang.,,6 8 
And there was concern in Defense 
that we might not h~ve adequate con-
ventional defense to refrain from using 
nuclear weapons when we would have 
preferred to limit our response to ag-
gression. "The decision to employ tacti-
cal nuclear weapons," testified Secre-
tary McNamara before the House 
Armed Services Committee in January 
1963, "should not be forced upon us 
simply because we have no other way to 
cope with a particular situation.,,6 9 
Another "defense intellectual," Alain 
Enthoven, stressed the same view in a 
major statement later the same year: 
We will have no sensible alter-
nalive to building lip our conven-
tional forces to the point at which 
they can safely resist all forms of 
non-nuclear aggression. Our forces 
will be adcquate if we can never 
be forced because of weakness to 
be the first to have to resort to 
nuclear weapons. 7 0 
A fler Ieavillg II\(~ Dd"II!'!' )}('parl-
mellt in 19MI, I\kNmllara r(!(~lIl1('(I: 
... strategic nuclear forces in 
tllt!nu;t:\vl!s no longer eonsl i tu ted :t 
ert:tlible tlelerrt'llt 10 11u: hrolld 
range of aggression, if indecd they 
ever had in the past. ... we could 
not substitute tactical nuclear 
weapons for conven tional forccs 
in the types of conflicts that were 
most likely to involve us in the 
period of the 1960s. 
WI' agreed, of COllrse, that an 
effeeth'e taclil'al nudl,:tr capa-
hility was eS!'l'nlial to our ov(:r-lIl1 
strategy. But we also felL very 
strongly LhllL Ihe decision to en!-
ploy slH'h 1I111'1.'ar w,'apolI:l shollld 
1101 hI' fort,(,tI IIpOIl II~ ~illlply 
because we had 110 oLher meallS to 
cope with COllnict. We recognized 
Lhell whaL has become so obvious 
now, Lhat Lhere would inev!Lably 
be many situations in which it 
would be neither feasible nor ad-
visable to usc tactical nuclear 
weapons.7 1 
When fael:d wiLh the tough deei~jon, 
President Kennedy was not at all in-
clined Lo usc the nuclear weapon except 
in dire circumstances. In 196 I, when 
considering inLervention in Laos, the 
qucsLion of the possihle alternatives for 
rescuing a contingent Lrapped in the 
landlocked counLry was rais(:c!. The 
'n'~IH)lJge from the miliLary was Lhat 
Hanoi would have to be desLroyed, 
probably using nuclear weapons. P"resi-
dent Kenncdy opted for diplomatic 
measures.72 Again, during thc Cuban 
missile crisis, a member of thc join t 
Chiefs argued that the United SLates 
could usc nuclear weapons on the hasis 
that our adversaries would use Lheirs 
againsL us in an attack. To Lhis Bobby 
Kcnnedy would comment: "f Lhought, 
as I lisLened, of the many times that I 
had hcard the military takl: pO!'itions 
which, if wrong, had the advantagc that 
no one would be around at the end to 
k now. ,,73 T he diplomatic-military 
combination was used instead. 
The johnson administration eon-
Linued in the same nuclear strall:gy. In 
opening his campaign on Labor Day, 
I 96t!., Ll3j criticized his opponent by 
implication in the most important cle-
ment of his speech: 
• . . Makc no mistakc, therc is 
no such thing as a conventional 
nuclear wcapon. For 19 peril-
filled years no nation has loosed 
the atom against anothcr. To do 
so now is a political decision of 
the highest order, and it would 
lead us down .111 uncerLain palh of 
blows and counlerblows who:::e 
oul('ollle none lIIay know. No 
I!resident of the Uniled Slales can 
divest himself of the responsibility 
for such a decision.74 
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II e eri tieized Senator (;oldwatel' 
throughout the I 96t!. campaign, re-
peating his theml: on lhis most sensitive 
subject. . He obviously subscribed to the 
theory of a nuclear firebreak when he 
added laler in Llw l:all1paigll: "1,1!l no 
one Lhink aLomie weapons arc simply 
bigger and more desLructive than other 
,,75 weapons .... 
Seeretary of State Rusk reiterated 
Lhe adminislration's fear of nucle.tr esca-
lation when he commented that once 
you introduce lIudear wI:apons for tac-
tical purposes, "you hegill to movc 
pWlllplly allrl vl'ry fast inlo a general 
nuclear exehange.,,7 6 
I,'or 20 YI!ars, theil, the United States 
It:ls ruled out of its options the use of 
nuclear weapons, save Lo protect those 
nations the loss of which would dras-
tically revise the world balance of 
power. 
The eonLinuing Lradition of nonuse 
of nuclear weapons in limited war, 
which we have traced above, is widening 
the nuclear "firebreak" each year. And 
Lhere arc no signs at present which 
would indieale ilny adlllinisirnlion in 
Lhe ncar future would resort lo nudear 
weapons to guarantee "vic Lory" in such 
a war. While there may be subtle or 
overt hrnlldishmenLs of nuclear arm a-
1II1:IILs in ddinition' of our most vilal 
fronLiers with militant CommunisLs, 
even there the circumstances and Liming 
of their cmployment remain suhject Lo 
serious debate . 
Conclusions. The American political 
process has been described as a struggle 
beLween dusters cutting across govern-
menLal structure, political parties, and 
inLerest groups and forming and reform-
ing around various causes or specific 
proposals.77 The decision for lise or 
nonuSI: of nudeilr weil(lons in limiled 
Will' is flllly ex p()~,~d 10 Ihis (In)("e~s. 
\rlll,·,·d it is, atlll shoulll Iw, primarily iI 
polilieal deeit'ioll. The "mililary neecs· 
sity" for nuclear weapons in limited 
con f1ieLs has been and will be seeondilry 
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in imporLance Lo many overriding eon-
sideraLions of domesLie and inLerna-
Lional poliLies, as well as oLher eonsid-
eraLions of our overallnaLional sLraLegy. 
BuL as imporLanL as LIII! inlluenees of 
Lhe domesLie poliLieal scene and Lhe 
opinions of our allies and friends may 
he, Lhey can be eonLrolled or overrulc'd 
hy a sLrong PresidenL eonvinl'ed of Lhe 
necessiLy for employmenL of LaeLieal 
nuclear weapons. 
Our nuclear sLraLegy, howevc!r, is 
eondiLioned by man)' fadors noL as 
easily manipulated in Lhe exeeutive 
hrandl of ollr GovernmenL. The growing 
eapabiliLies of our encmies, the known 
weaknesscs of oLher free naLions, Lhe 
potl'nLialiLies of Lhe ycL undeveloped 
nudear arsenals of medium and minor 
powers-all Lhese clements musL be 
weighed carefully by a PresidenL ahouL 
Lo reic!ase authority for Lhe employmenL 
of nudear weapons. Thc!y ,111 Lend Lo 
diseourage his seleeLion of Lhe nudear 
opLion. 
The historieal pre!ee'denLs and adviee 
of five PresidC'nt~ will IIndouhl!!clly have 
substantial influC'ncl' on tlw dc'c:i:,ion:' of 
[uture! Pre'~idc!nt~. Thc'ir rc'slraint oYc'r 
tlw lasl 25 ),c!ars will make it more! 
diffieulL for any SIIl'ees.'.;or Lo ehoosc! 
nudear weapons as a means of gaining 
our oiJjeeLivc:s in limilc'c1 war. 
The impaeL of all these faeLors, for-
eign and domes Lie, on Lhis deeision-
making proeess musL he undersLood lIy 
our miliLary leaders. AL leasL in Lhe 
higher levels of command, our generals 
and admirals musL know undcr just 
what eirelllnsLanees Lhey can c!x pc!eL Lo 
be permiLLccl the usc' of nudear wc'ap-
ons. The case for Lhis clear definiLion 
wu~ made hy MorL Hulperin uL Lhe Lime 
of Lhe Berlin crisis in 19()j. 
I f we do inLend Lo rulc! ouL the USC! 
of taC'tieal IIIwit'ar wC',lpons in 
C'e'rtain situations. wc' 'We'd to 
make that l'lear 10 the mililary 
long before the lime arisc's wllC';' 
Lhe nuclc!ar weapons mighL hc! 
used. The miliL"ry needs Lo under-
sLand Lhe kinds of pressures whieh 
Lhe civilian Icaders musL Lake in Lo 
eonsidcraLion in deLerminin9 the proper role of miliLary foree. 8 
The inLelligenL formulaLion and effec-
tive exeeuLion of our worldwide sLraLe-
gy depend on mu Lual undersLanding of 
our nuclear intenLions by boLh miliLary 
and civilian leaders. 
RealizaLion of all these faeLs of poli-
Lies and wur docs noL, however, c!xdude 
LIH! effeeLivI: lISI! of Pre$iclc!n Lial jnclg-
menL on Lhe elllploymenL of ladic'al 
nuelear weapons. As long as we relllain 
within Lhe conLexL of limiLed war, the 
foreseeable eireulIlsLances which coulll 
compel the Pre~idenL Lo auLhorize LIII! 
firsL usc of nuclear weapons arc very 
difficulL Lo projc:cL. Evc:n the possibiliLy 
of defeuL in limiLed w.ar would noL sway 
a sLrong PresidenL iT he felL oLher fueLors 
recommended ahsLenLion raLher Lhan 
employmenL. Tlw clamor ami cries at 
home mighL be f'Lronger Lhan LllOsr. in 
tlte i\laeArLhur episode. BuL the require-
IIlI'nt~ o[ our nalional Slralc'/!y ancl 
eon."idc!f:ltions of inlc'rnal ional Jlolilil'~ 
would sustain a Pn:~idc:nL eonvineecl o[ 
Lhe corrl'cLllI!ss of his decision. 
On ~he oLher hand, when Llw sLakes 
,Ire raisc!d, wlwn tlu: threat is I'c~cld"ilH~c1 
as u reriolls and lInfavoruble readjusL-
menL of Lhe world balunce of power, 
only overriding clemen Is of our world-
wide sLrategie posture could resLrain Lhe 
President from employi~'g taeLical nu-
clear weapons. Such a Lhreat could grow 
out of a war begun as a local aggression 
employing only conventional weapons. 
It might well end with the first nuclear 
deLonution in combaL since Nagasaki. 
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